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D E D I C A T I O N  A N D  A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S  
 Writing about an extremely controversial topic can be difficult. I oftentimes found myself 
thinking about whether I should even undertake such a task because of the harsh criticisms I may 
receive. I oftentimes wondered about the implications and effects of my reasoning and 
conclusions and the possible effects such conclusions would have on my future if I entered into 
politics or law. It would be much easier from this standpoint to write about whether the world 
exists or not. It was during these times of doubt that I relied on my family and friends. I am 
extremely grateful to my mother and father who always taught me to stand firm in my beliefs 
and to be courageous in defending them. I know that if I defend what I believe to be true and 
right, then I will be happy with the outcome despite the consequences. My mother and father also 
fostered in me a wonderful sense of open-mindedness and ability to give equal consideration to 
all ideas, thoughts, arguments and people. This sense of courage, loyalty to my beliefs, and open-
mindedness helped me write this thesis. As a heterosexual male, sometimes I found it difficult to 
write about homosexuality solely because I do not know what it is like to be homosexual and 
can’t relate to their experiences. It was during these times that I received timeless advice from 
my mother and father in the form of empathy and reason. I had an easier time writing once I 
began to think and ask myself what I would want out of an intimate relationship and the 
pleasures that such relationships bring and then think whether homosexuals would want these 
same things or would experience these same pleasures. My parents also gave me the strength to 
realize that if I give equal consideration to the arguments for and against homosexuality, then I 
should be confident in whatever conclusions that I draw. This thesis would not have been 
possible without the love and support of my parents. In completing this four year milestone I 
realize that graduating has been a four year project for me, but it has been a twenty-two year 
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project for my parents. This is just as much my accomplishment as it is theirs. Thank you for 
shaping me into the thoughtful, kind, tolerant and successful man that I am today. 
 To my friends, thank you for providing much needed relief, support and advice during the 
semester. It truly is a wonderful feeling knowing that I have friends who will always support me 
no matter what I believe or do. Thank you for your friendship; I truly feel blessed to have such 
an amazing group of friends who have always been with me through the good times and the bad. 
 To Professor Rajczi and the Claremont McKenna College philosophy department, thank 
you for providing me with an invaluable education and for developing my critical thinking 
abilities in a rigorous and thoughtful manner. I have become a better thinker, writer and 
philosopher thanks to the dedication and skill of my professors. I could not have imagined a 
better education and feel incredibly blessed to have been able to work closely with such 
intelligent, passionate and thoughtful people. 
 This thesis is dedicated to everyone who has believed in me, taught me, supported me 
and remained loyal to me throughout these four years and in the process of writing this thesis. 
Thank you.   
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I N T R O D U C T I O N  
 Homosexuality is an important and controversial topic in political, philosophical, ethical 
and religious spheres. We are exposed to the debate of homosexuality in the media on a regular 
basis and issues related to homosexuality have been taken up by the Supreme Court, politicians 
and religious institutions. Needless to say, the debate surrounding homosexuality has captured 
the attention of almost everyone in society to some degree. It is my goal in this thesis to give a 
candid overview and analysis of the arguments surrounding homosexual sexual conduct. First, I 
will present an argument by John Corvino, who posits that homosexual conduct can realize the 
same concrete goods of love, happiness, and pleasure, among others, that heterosexual conduct 
can realize. Namely, if homosexual conduct can produce these goods, then there is no reason on 
the face of things to treat homosexual conduct as morally inferior to heterosexual conduct. I will 
then consider an objection by Michael Levin who asserts that even if this is true, there is a 
prudential reason to discourage homosexual conduct because it leads to unhappiness. 
Specifically, he claims that homosexuals misuse their sexual organs and such a misuse is 
unnatural. As Levin believes that behavior which is unnatural leads to unhappiness, he concludes 
that homosexual conduct leads to unhappiness and should therefore be discouraged. Homosexual 
conduct then has negative consequences which are not entailed by heterosexual conduct. This 
fact counts prudentially against homosexual conduct and undermines Corvino’s argument.  I will 
then examine an argument by Alan Goldman, who presents a definition of sex which he believes 
best matches our common intuitions and judgments in regards to what sexual activity is and isn’t. 
Goldman argues against definitions of sexual activity which posit that the purpose of sexual 
activity is to fulfill some external goal or purpose to sex itself, such as reproduction or love. 
These definitions are typically labeled as means-end analyses of sex. Goldman outlines that sex 
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is essentially a physical desire for contact with another’s body. If Goldman’s definition is 
correct, contra the means-end definitions of sex, then his definition entails that homosexual 
conduct is not immoral. Afterwards, I will give my own thoughts as to what moral conclusions 
we should draw about homosexual conduct based on the above arguments.  
 I recognize that the debate surrounding homosexuality typically operates in the realm of 
marriage. I distinguish between homosexual conduct and homosexual marriage because there are 
things that people do in the privacy of their bedrooms that are unrelated to marriage. 
Specifically, people can ask whether such sexual bedroom activities are wrong or sinful, whether 
or not they relate to marriage. The issue of homosexual marriage is clearly a distinct issue 
because there may be people who think that homosexual conduct is wrong, but who believe that 
as a matter of legal right, homosexual marriage should be legal because it is required by equal 
protection of all citizens. To illustrate, there are people in America who think that it is immoral 
to get divorced and then re-marry. However, such people do not believe that such re-marriages or 
marriages in general should be illegal.1 In other words, they make a moral judgment about 
behavior but do not simultaneously label the institution in which the behavior takes place as 
immoral or illegal. One can then discuss homosexual conduct without implicating any 
conclusions regarding homosexual marriage. 
 Religion also takes a significant role in the debates surrounding homosexuality. I avoid 
religious arguments because I believe that my arguments will engage religious people who do 
not go on pure doctrinal faith. It is my belief that most religious people engage in moral 
reasoning when they read the bible or other primary text. There are clear disagreements amongst 
religious people about what exactly God’s Word is, signaling that many religious people do not 
                                                             
1 I thank Professor Alex Rajczi of Claremont McKenna College for this illustration and the preceding 
explanation 
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take every bible or religious verse as dogma. I can make a contribution to religious thinking by 
asserting an argument that I believe has the potential to engage religious people in critical 
thought about why homosexual conduct is immoral or not. This is valuable in itself. It is also 
important to me to engage the secular, or non-religious community because I want my thesis to 
engage as many readers as possible. 
  This thesis mostly uses examples of and speaks in terms of male homosexual conduct. I 
do this mainly because the articles that I cite and interact with do the same. However, my 
argument can be just as equally applied to female homosexual conduct. Namely, in some areas I 
will state things such as “inserting the penis into the anus is not a misuse of body parts.” This 
could easily be translated into female homosexual conduct in the form of “rubbing another 
vagina against another vagina is not a misuse of body parts.” I mention this to clarify that when I 
use the term “homosexual,” it applies to both male and female homosexuals respectively.  
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C H A P T E R  O N E :  G L E N N  A N D  S T A C Y   
 Glenn and Stacy are driving home after a night out on the town. As they cross a bridge, 
traffic comes to a halt due to a snowstorm. Despite being stuck in traffic, each thinks to 
themselves how beautiful the snow is and how the warmth of each other’s touch serves as a 
perfect way to fend off the cool, crisp night air. As ten, then twenty minutes pass, Glenn and 
Stacy do what most young couples would do. They start to make out. While waiting for traffic 
for nearly an hour they kiss, cuddle and conclude that life is wonderful. This story reminds us of 
the value of intimate human connections and perhaps even reminds us of a romantic time and 
special feeling of intimacy that we once experienced with a significant other. The story is 
familiar and at the same time evokes our desire that such experiences will become more familiar 
to us. Perhaps we even hope that Glenn and Stacy will marry, spend a happy life together and 
look back at the happy, romantic experience they had with each other on the bridge. Glenn and 
Stacy are both men. This true-life anecdote is presented by John Corvino in his article 
“Homosexuality and the Moral Relevance of Experience.” 
 What at first appeared to be a romantic, charming story will now strike some as revolting 
and controversial. Readers may react with the sentiment “but that’s just wrong” and that “no 
matter how right and good and beautiful the experience felt to Glenn and Stacy at the time, there 
are countless others who will object that the two of them are simply deceiving themselves” 
(Corvino 241). To illustrate, a self-professed ex-gay named Charles recounted a homosexual 
experience that he had with a stranger at a rest stop. He concluded afterwards that “suddenly I 
knew deep in my heart that what I was doing was wrong and I vowed then and there that I would 
change” (Corvino 242). Charles and Glenn actually met each and each maintained the 
conclusions they drew from their respective homosexual experiences. The reader is thus 
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presented with “two stories, two experiences and two very different moral conclusions” (Corvino 
242). Specifically, each experience offers a moral insight into homosexuality in that one (Glenn) 
sees the experience as a “means of human connection and deep personal fulfillment” and the 
other (Charles) sees his experience as “a misguided addiction leading to despair and 
hopelessness” (Corvino 242).  
 Corvino presents this argument as a means of addressing the many individuals who have 
never had the type of homosexual experiences that Glenn, Stacy and Charles have and who 
remain perplexed and confused about how to solve the moral dilemma presented by this case. 
What moral conclusions should we reach about homosexuals such as Glenn, Stacy and Charles? 
How much emphasis should be put on their relevant experiences in reaching such moral 
conclusions? In the process of attempting to answer these questions, it will become clear that the 
experiences of homosexuals and the reflections they draw from those experiences is relevant to 
the moral judgments and conclusions we make about homosexual conduct.  
 To avoid confusion and to clarify what is at stake in this argument, it should be noted that 
Corvino’s main thesis is: “whatever sort of activity is permissible for heterosexuals is 
permissible for homosexuals” (Corvino 244). In this vein, Corvino wants to establish that gender 
is not relevant to relationships or their moral character. It is also important to note that Corvino 
recognizes that just because something “feels good” is not an excuse to engage in that behavior, 
let alone draw the conclusion that the action is morally correct (Corvino 242). When analyzing 
this case, we should keep in mind what made this behavior seem good to us in the first place, 
before we discovered that Glenn and Stacy were both men. Corvino’s list of goods that are 
realized by Glenn and Stacy’s experience are listed later in this paper, but for now I allow the 
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reader to form their own opinion regarding what it was about Glenn and Stacy’s activity that 
seemed good.  
 The notion that homosexual conduct can generate the same goods as heterosexual 
conduct is the underpinning of Corvino’s “prima facie argument.” Prima facie essentially means 
“at first glance” or “at first appearance.” The goal of such an argument in this case is to find 
some justification or reason to treat homosexual conduct and heterosexual conduct as morally 
equivalent at first glance. To illustrate, going to the doctor and getting a shot is painful. The fact 
that it is painful is a prima facie reason to not go to the doctor. It indeed turns out upon further 
examination that there are overriding reasons, such as health and well-being, which outweigh 
this prima facie reason to not go. However, the painfulness caused by the shot is still a reason 
that on the face of things counts against going to the doctor.   
I. The Prima Facie Goods Argument 
 The “prima facie goods argument” may be re-written into the form of: (i) Many times 
homosexual behavior realizes concrete goods without any bad consequences. (ii) Sexual 
behavior that yields goods without any negative consequences is prima facie morally justified. 
(iii) From (i) and (ii) it follows that homosexual behavior is prima facie morally justified. (iv) 
Sexual behavior that is prima facie morally justified can be prohibited only if there is a strong 
reason and supporting evidence to prohibit it. (v) As Corvino has illustrated, there do not seem to 
be any relevant or strong reasons to prohibit homosexual behavior. (vi) Thus, homosexual 
behavior cannot be prohibited on any justifiable grounds. This argument works in tandem with 
another argument that Corvino sets forth which I will call the “comparative argument.” 
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II. The Comparative Argument 
  Corvino argues that the relevant features of this particular instance of homosexual 
behavior are the same features that make a heterosexual relationship valuable. Namely, (i) 
society accepts and deems much heterosexual behavior to be moral. (ii) Homosexual behavior 
and heterosexual behavior are analogous in terms of the goods that each can realize. (iii) Thus, 
sexual activity that is morally permissible for heterosexuals is also morally permissible for 
homosexuals.  
III. The Prima Facie and Comparative Arguments Combined 
 The conclusion we drew from the prima facie goods argument can be stated generally as: 
(i) sexual activity that produces concrete goods is prima facie morally acceptable. The 
conclusion that we drew from the comparative argument is: (ii) homosexual activity is able to 
realize these goods in the same way that heterosexual activity is able to realize them. It seems 
then that the argument from goods coupled with the argument by analogy implies a “prima facie 
argument in favor of homosexuality” in that homosexual activity is able to fulfill and realize all 
of the “concrete goods” that “non-procreative heterosexual activity does” (Corvino 243).  
 It is important to note that Corvino is not arguing that all homosexual behaviors lead to 
and realize these concrete goods. Corvino asks us to remember Charles, whose homosexual 
experiences left him feeling “empty and degraded” (Corvino 243). However, just as it is 
important that we do not generalize about heterosexual couples from what we see on Jerry 
Springer, it is also important that we do not generalize about homosexual couples from certain 
anecdotes and negative experiences. Corvino recognizes that “sex is powerful” for both 
homosexual and heterosexual people and can therefore have good and bad effects for both types 
of relationships (Corvino 243). Corvino’s point is that homosexual experience has the potential 
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to and can realize the very same goods that heterosexual non-procreative experience sometimes 
realizes.  
IV. Two Interpretations of Corvino’s Argument 
 
a. The First Interpretation 
 
 One may think that the Glenn and Stacy example is simply a way of comparing specific 
sexual activities to one another. For example, Corvino wants to show us that the act of kissing 
between homosexual Glenn and Stacy is morally equivalent to the act of kissing between 
heterosexual Glenn and Stacy. Essentially, Corvino presents a thought experiment wherein the 
reader thinks of a heterosexual activity that they think is good. Then he wants us to think of the 
equivalent homosexual sexual activity and whether it is different in any important respect. Under 
this interpretation, we are simply comparing non-procreative and specific sexual acts to one 
another. Under such an interpretation, opponents of Corvino may be able to weaken his argument 
because such an interpretation renders the example of Glenn and Stacy incomplete in an 
important aspect. Specifically, in the case of Glenn and Stacy, all that happens is non-procreative 
conduct. Objectors can simply point out that all that Corvino has proved is that there is a prima 
facie reason to believe that homosexual conduct that does not lead to sex is morally permissible. 
Specifically, Corvino states “if heterosexual kissing is permissible, then homosexual kissing is 
permissible. If heterosexual oral sex is permissible, then homosexual oral sex is permissible- and 
so on” (Corvino 244). However, the phrase “and so on” signals a major omission in his 
argument. Full-blown sex. Corvino has left out any discussion of actual sexual activity. Clearly 
there is a difference between heterosexual sex and homosexual sex, not in terms of gender, but in 
terms of what goes where. Namely, in homosexual sex, the penis is inserted into the anus while 
in heterosexual sex the penis is inserted into the vagina. Objectors can claim that this is a morally 
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relevant difference because many people believe that anal sex for heterosexuals is immoral. If 
Corvino wants to maintain his analogy, then he will first have to face the fact that many people 
do not agree on what constitutes permissible heterosexual activity. Namely, if some people 
believe that sodomy for heterosexuals is not morally permissible, then Corvino’s argument 
becomes weaker in that it opens the door for an objector to say that homosexual sex is also 
morally wrong. It is not relevant that some may believe that sodomy is morally permissible 
because Corvino’s main thesis is that what is morally permissible for heterosexuals is also 
permissible for homosexuals. If there is widespread disagreement about a significant difference 
between the morality of homosexual and heterosexual sexual conduct (which I assume the penis-
vaginal vs. penis-anal issue to be) then Corvino’s argument by analogy does not hold. However, 
such an interpretation, while detrimental to Corvino, would not be used by an opponent of 
homosexuality. Specifically, opponents of homosexuality are uncomfortable in granting any 
form of homosexual conduct, whether it is kissing or anal sex, a positive moral status. Rather, 
they would argue that any form of homosexual conduct is immoral. Although it may seem 
fruitless to point out an argument that may not be used “in the real world” it is important to point 
out all possible interpretations of an argument out of fairness and pure intellectual appreciation. 
However, perhaps we were being unfair to Corvino in presenting this interpretation because there 
is another interpretation of his argument that would strengthen his argument and protect him 
from one who would posit that his argument is incomplete.  
b. The Second Interpretation 
 Rather than viewing Corvino’s argument as a comparison, we can view it as an argument 
about goods. It can be argued that homosexual sex can realize the same concrete goods that 
heterosexual sex realizes. While this interpretation inherently involves a comparison of specific 
Hansen  14 
 
acts, such an interpretation is different from that advanced in section IV (a) because it hinges on 
the goods produced, rather than the acts in themselves. Therefore, we conclude from such an 
interpretation that if homosexual sex can be reasonably seen as able to realize the same concrete 
goods that heterosexual sex realizes, then there seems to be no reason to discriminate against 
homosexual conduct. What then are these concrete goods? Corvino lays them out partially with 
his Glenn and Stacy example on the bridge. For example, the act of kissing between Glenn and 
Stacy is behavior that “is pleasurable […] this fact is not sufficient to justify it, but all else being 
equal, it is certainly a point in its favor” (Corvino 242). Also, the behavior “opened an avenue of 
communication, allowing them to express affection in a manner for which mere words would 
have been inadequate” and “facilitated a kind of connection between the two parties: their 
physical intimacy both manifested and enhanced their emotional intimacy” (Corvino 242). 
Finally, while this is not a good, it is important to note that there were no negative features of the 
behavior. Nobody was coerced to do something that they did not want to do nor were they 
putting themselves at risk. The homosexual conduct of Glenn and Stacy then produces pleasure, 
a form of communication, intimacy, personal fulfillment and love. These are concrete goods that 
are realized in heterosexual acts as well. Before we learn that Glenn and Stacy are homosexuals, 
their experience resonated with us precisely because, I presume, heterosexual experiences have 
produced these same goods of pleasure, communication, intimacy, fulfillment and love. As 
Corvino points out “these are reasons why activities such as kissing, cuddling and caressing can 
be morally valuable even when they do not lead to intercourse” (Corvino 243). It is reasonable to 
claim then that homosexual Glenn and Stacy and a hypothetical heterosexual Glenn and Stacy, 
who engage in the same non-reproductive sexual acts (kissing, cuddling, caressing) realize the 
same concrete goods. Thus, given that homosexual and heterosexual non-procreative sexual 
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conduct can lead to the same concrete goods, why is homosexual conduct morally wrong and 
heterosexual conduct morally right? It is not enough to explain as the difference the fact that one 
involves a same sex couple and the other does not. That would beg the question in that such a 
proposition assumes precisely what we are trying to prove. 
 This puts the opponent of homosexual conduct in a difficult position because it entails 
that they either 1) accept that homosexual and heterosexual non-procreative conduct are morally 
equivalent because they lead to the same goods or 2) admit that while homosexual non-
procreative sexual conduct is on par morally with heterosexual non-procreative sex acts, it is not 
true that penis-vaginal sex is on par morally with penis-anal sex. Corvino does not take up this 
issue directly, nor does the Glenn and Stacy example enter into this realm. However, it can be 
argued that penis-vaginal sex and penis-anal sex acts lead to the same concrete goods. 
V. The Concrete Good of Procreation 
 An immediate objection to this line of reasoning is that heterosexual sex can lead to 
procreation while homosexual sex never leads to procreation. This is a concrete good that 
heterosexuals can realize that homosexual sex conduct does not realize and can never realize. 
The concrete good possibly being the knowledge or pleasure that one derives in the realization 
that one is mutually creating a life with a person that they love. Therefore, this is a morally 
relevant difference and reason to place homosexual and heterosexual conduct on different moral 
planes. The argument would proceed as i) heterosexual sexual conduct can lead to procreation ii) 
the act of procreation is a concrete good iii) homosexual conduct never leads to procreation iv) 
homosexual conduct fails to realize a concrete good that heterosexual conduct realizes c) there is 
then a relevant moral reason to differentiate between homosexual and heterosexual conduct. At 
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first glance this is a powerful response because (i-iii) are brute facts and (iv,c) are simple logical 
deductions made from those facts. There are two lines of response available to such an argument.  
 First, this argument can be aimed directly at heterosexuals. There are men who are 
infertile, women who have gone through menopause or have other diseases that render them 
unable to reproduce. It would seem that under this argument, sexual intercourse between 
heterosexual couples who cannot reproduce is morally inferior to sexual intercourse between 
heterosexuals who can reproduce because the former does not realize this concrete good of 
reproduction that the latter does. This is an absurd conclusion. The claim that heterosexuals who 
cannot reproduce are somehow engaging in sexual activity that is morally inferior to 
heterosexual activity that does lead to reproduction places the morality of sexual activity in a 
position of dependency upon a successful uniting of sperm and egg. This is an odd standard of 
morality because we can imagine two different heterosexual couples engaging in identical 
activity, but for some reason or other, heterosexual couple A consistently fails to reproduce, 
while heterosexual couple B is successful. The difference between the two couples then is in one 
case sperm successfully unites with an egg, while in the other case the sperm failed to 
successfully unite with the egg. To claim that this now renders the sexual activity of couple A 
any less moral than that of couple B operates on a standard of morality that most people would 
not accept. It follows then that simply because homosexual conduct can never lead to 
reproduction, in the same way that the sexual conduct of heterosexual couple A can never lead to 
reproduction, does not mean that homosexual conduct is morally inferior as a result of this 
failure. If we grant that the sexual conduct of heterosexual couple A is morally on par with the 
sexual conduct of heterosexual couple B, then logically we must grant that homosexual conduct 
is also on par morally with heterosexual couple B.  
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 A reply to this line of reasoning may be that homosexual activity is not morally on par 
with the sexual activity of heterosexuals for other reasons. For example, some may say that 
penis-anal sex is morally inferior to penis-vaginal sex because it is a misuse of body parts or that 
it is not natural. I will deal with this line of reasoning later in the paper, but for now it is enough 
to point out that the original objection is that homosexual conduct is morally inferior to 
heterosexual conduct because it cannot realize the concrete good of reproduction. Such an 
argument has now been logically proven to not entail such a conclusion.  
VI. A Second Reply to the Procreation Argument 
 The second reply dovetails from the first line of reasoning. As was explained above, 
while reproduction may be a concrete good, it is both not a good standard by which to judge the 
morality of sexual activity. By the same token, it is not the only concrete good that is realized by 
sexual activity. The reproduction argument fails to take into account that it is also an obvious 
fact that heterosexuals engage in sex for reasons other than to reproduce. The list is quite long 
but the important concrete goods that sex can realize are that it is intensely pleasurable, it fosters 
emotional and physical intimacy, it expresses deep emotions that words cannot convey and it 
strengthens the commitment of two people to each other. I would like to point out that I realize 
that not all sexual encounters realize these goods to the same extent and sometimes fail to realize 
a majority of the goods listed. However, it cannot be denied that sex has the potential to realize 
these concrete goods, which is the point. Homosexual activity can certainly realize every 
concrete good that heterosexual activity can and an opponent of such a view would find it 
difficult to be taken seriously in claiming otherwise. For example, an opponent who claims that 
homosexuals do not find their own sexual activity pleasurable is essentially saying that they 
know better than homosexuals about what is actually pleasurable. Telling someone, who 
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experiences intense pleasure through their conduct, that what they are experiencing as pleasure 
really isn’t pleasure, is absurd. The same reasoning can be used for any other concrete good 
listed. If the same concrete goods can be realized by both homosexual and heterosexual acts, 
then opponents must indicate a morally relevant difference between the two. The Glenn and 
Stacy example shows that in terms of concrete goods, there is no morally relevant difference 
between the two types of conduct. Just think back to when you read the story of Glenn and Stacy 
before you discovered that they were homosexuals. It probably reminded you of some of the 
concrete goods that you have experienced in a relationship or in an intimate experience with 
someone else. It seems then that even intuitively we grant that homosexuals and heterosexual 
activity both can potentially realize identical concrete goods. 
VII. Summary 
 So far we have examined Corvino’s argument that homosexual sexual activity is prima 
facie morally justified. Homosexual conduct produces the same goods as heterosexual conduct 
produces. Namely, each produces an avenue of communication, love, intimacy and pleasure. 
There is then no morally relevant difference to treat heterosexual and homosexual conduct 
differently. Thus, whatever sexual activity is morally acceptable for heterosexuals is also 
acceptable for homosexuals. We then saw two interpretations of such an argument and made 
replies to each. First, we can view the argument not from goods, but from a comparative 
standpoint. However, such an argument is incomplete because Corvino never explicitly mentions 
penis-anal or penis-vaginal sexual activity. He stops short. However, the other interpretation 
regarding goods serves to bolster his argument by showing that any homosexual activity, 
whether it is making out or full blown sexual intercourse, is morally equivalent to the 
corresponding heterosexual sexual activity due to the realization of identical goods. It was also 
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pointed out that the concrete good of procreation, while it can never be realized by homosexuals, 
is not a morally relevant difference or reason to treat homosexual conduct differently from 
heterosexual conduct because it leads to the absurd conclusion that heterosexuals who cannot 
reproduce are somehow engaging in sexual activity that is morally inferior to heterosexual sexual 
activity that does lead to reproduction .Such  a line of reasoning also fails to realize that humans 
engage in sex for reasons other than procreation. 
VIII. Open Lines of Response 
 Of course the story does not end here. Opponents have open lines of response to my 
reasoning. Those who disagree with Corvino can grant all of the above arguments and simply 
claim the relevant difference between homosexuals and heterosexuals has nothing to do with 
concrete goods. The relevant difference comes into play when we examine how body parts are 
being used and what they are being used for.  
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C H A P T E R  2 :  H O M O S E X U A L I T Y  A N D  H A P P I N E S S  
 Remember that Corvino has claimed that all of the goods that can be produced through 
heterosexual conduct can be produced through homosexual conduct. He gave us the Glenn and 
Stacy example to convince us that whatever good heterosexuals receive from their activity, 
homosexuals likewise receive the same goods too. Despite the apparent similarity in conduct and 
outcomes, we have reason to suspect that in the long term homosexual activity will have 
different effects and produce fewer goods and even bad results. This is the view that is advanced 
by Michael Levin. He claims that homosexuality is abnormal not because it is immoral or 
because it weakens society, but rather, because it “is a misuse of body parts” (Levin 233). In this 
vein, he argues that homosexuality is abnormal in both a “descriptive and normative sense” 
because homosexuals are “bound to be unhappy” for “evolutionary reasons” (Levin 236). The 
argumentative structure of this logic partially utilizes a means-end analysis of sex to achieve its 
desired conclusion. Means-end analyses of sex will be covered in greater detail in chapter three, 
but to avoid confusion, it is enough to point out that such analyses of sex posit that sex is to be 
used as a means to achieve something good external to it, whether it be pleasure, procreation, 
release of tension, etc, rather than as an end in itself. It is also important to note that Levin’s 
argument is a very prudential one; it does not make any normative or moral conclusions. It 
merely attempts to show that homosexuals are bound to be unhappy due to the “misuse” of their 
body parts. A few preliminary and clarifying remarks must be made before delving into Levin’s 
argument. Specifically, Levin is going to appeal to the notion of what is abnormal, natural and 
unnatural. It is important then to clarify what these terms mean and what moral weight their 
definitions carry, if any.  
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I. Clarifying the Argument 
 
a. What does abnormal mean? 
 
 Levin claims that homosexuality is abnormal because it is a misuse of body parts. It is 
important to figure out what Levin even means by “abnormal.” He does not define what this 
means, nor does he give us a clear sense of what counts as abnormal and what does not. The 
closest he comes to such an ideal is his claim that “my argument permits gradations in 
abnormality. Behavior is the more abnormal, and the less likely to be rewarding, the more its 
emission tends to extinguish a genetic cohort that practices it. The less likely a behavior is to get 
selected out, the less abnormal it is” (Levin 238). Levin also interchanges “abnormal” with 
“unnatural” throughout his work. Levin is then not using the term abnormal in the sense that 
means atypical or uncommon, but rather in the sense of unnaturalness or in the sense that 
something that is abnormal goes against the nature of things. For Levin then, homosexuality is 
abnormal in the sense that it is contrary to nature, not in the sense that it is not common or goes 
against some societal norm. 
b. What is natural or unnatural? 
 First, Levin recognizes that the definition of nature has no implications on morality. 
Specifically, nature has no normative force. It is a common mistake to believe that nature has 
normative force, but Levin avoids such a mistake. In claiming that nature has no normative force, 
I mean that there is not some mysterious force of nature that forces us towards certain actions. If 
some members in society suddenly decided to cure diseases by blood-letting and refusing 
traditional medicine, an activity that certainly would be selected out (and has been) by nature, 
there is not some force of nature that would stop them or command them to stop. While Levin is 
not claiming that what is unnatural is immoral, it should be pointed out to readers that such a 
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view would be a mistake. Levin avoids such a view by attempting to connect unnaturalness with 
unhappiness and not necessarily to morality or immorality.   
 In terms of definition, Levin believes that what is natural is what increases evolutionary 
fitness. Against this view, it has been argued that the very notion of calling certain actions 
natural or unnatural is incoherent and makes no sense on the grounds that to do this means that 
we are claiming that something is outside of nature or our world, “which cannot in principle be 
true.”2 Levin could respond by simply claiming accurately that just because everything which 
exists in the world is indeed natural, this does not mean that every behavior is an evolved 
behavior that increases fitness. Even if everything is natural, there are some behaviors that 
people do simply because it increases fitness. Namely, an action may be natural because it occurs 
in the natural world but it is unnatural in the sense that it may not increase fitness or is an action 
that we did not evolve to perform.  
 Applying this to homosexuality, such behavior may indeed be natural in the sense that it 
occurs in the natural world, but is unnatural because it does not increase fitness. As will be 
discussed in greater detail below, Levin believes that the homosexual trait has survived through a 
process called pleiotropy. The theory of pleiotropy posits that a certain gene survives through 
“the expression in more than one phenotype,” namely “the polygene that codes for 
homosexuality presumably also codes for some other traits that strongly enhances fitness” (Levin 
240). Levin admits that no one knows what that trait might be but simply that homosexuality is 
just a negative side-effect of some other gene that codes for a trait that is better fit for survival. 
Therefore, homosexuality is still unnatural because the enjoyment of homosexuality in itself does 
                                                             
2 This line of argument is advanced by Michael Slote in an article entitled “Inapplicable Concepts and 
Sexual Perversion.” Cited: Slote, Michael. "Inapplicable Concepts and Sexual Perversion." Philosophy and Sex. 
Eds. Robert Baker and Frederick Elliston. Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1975. 261-268. Print. 
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not increase fitness. Furthermore, if it stood alone genetically it would not reinforce itself. It 
would be selected out. He makes an analogy between this and the survival of genetic diseases 
such as the sickle-cell anemia. Sickle-cell anemia has survived because it also “confers immunity 
from malaria” (Levin 240). While sickle-cell anemia is not fitness enhancing, it still survives 
through the expression in another gene which does increase fitness. Pleiotropy has been 
recognized by evolutionary biologists and is a powerful theory for why homosexuality has 
survived in the gene pool, despite the fact that homosexuals leave no offspring. Such a theory 
would then allow Levin to make the connection between homosexuality and unnaturalness, 
despite the fact that the homosexual trait has survived in the gene pool. Specifically, 
homosexuality does not increase fitness despite its continued presence in the gene pool. 
Therefore, homosexuality is unnatural.  
 Why then does Levin introduce this idea of naturalness? He introduces this idea because 
he wants to connect what is natural to what produces happiness and what is unnatural produces 
unhappiness. His argument then amounts to the idea that 1) homosexuality is unnatural and 2) 
what is unnatural is statistically likely to lead to unhappiness and therefore C) homosexuality is 
therefore not likely to lead to happiness. It is worth noting that if this is correct, it is significant 
because it would contradict Corvino’s claim, as illustrated by Glenn and Stacy, that homosexual 
activity will produce the same goods as heterosexual activity. He presents this argument with an 
example of a man who pulls out all of his teeth. 
II. Pulling Teeth and Homosexual Conduct 
 Levin’s paradigm case in describing the abnormality of homosexuality involves Mr. 
Jones, who pulls out all of his teeth and makes a necklace out of them to wear around his neck. 
Levin claims that Mr. Jones is clearly not using his teeth for what they are intended for. This is 
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correct. Also, Levin claims that the way Mr. Jones is using them is incompatible with their 
natural purpose. This is also correct. Finally, Levin is also correct in claiming that the way Mr. 
Jones is using his teeth will be physiologically harmful. Mr. Jones’s gums will be affected by the 
non-use of his jaw for chewing. His digestive tract that is meant to process solid foods will suffer 
and he will probably live a shorter and less healthy life than normal. We also expect Jones to 
yearn to chew something, as it is an inherent desire and natural tendency for human beings to 
want to chew. Levin argues that natural selection has “selected in muscles for chewing and 
favored creatures with such muscles, it has selected in a tendency to find the use of those 
muscles reinforcing” and “creatures who do not enjoy using such parts of their bodies as 
deteriorate with disuse will tend to be selected out” (Levin 234). Therefore, we expect Jones to 
have fewer descendants than others who properly use their teeth. Levin then claims that “the 
application of this general picture to homosexuality should be obvious” (Levin 234). The 
application to this and homosexuality will be explored in depth below if it is not obvious at first 
glance 
III. Implications for Homosexual Conduct 
 Levin points out that “one of the functions of the penis is to introduce semen into the 
vagina. It does this, and it has been selected in because it does this […] nature has consequently 
made this use of the penis rewarding” (Levin 234). Humans who found this use of the penis 
unrewarding have left no descendants. Specifically, those who have found enjoyment in 
“inserting their penises into each other’s anuses have left no descendants” (Levin 234). For 
Levin, “this is why homosexuality is abnormal, and why its abnormality counts prudentially 
against it” (Levin 234). Homosexuality is then likely to lead to unhappiness precisely because “it 
leaves unfulfilled an innate and innately rewarding desire” (Levin 234). Concerning his claim 
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that homosexuality leads to unhappiness, he recognizes that it concerns “tendencies and 
probabilities” (Levin 234). This being so, it must be made clear that what Levin means when he 
states that “homosexuals are bound to be less happy” is that “not coincidentally, a larger 
proportion of homosexuals will be unhappy than a corresponding selection of the heterosexual 
population” (Levin 234). Levin also argues that looking at cases of “well-adjusted” homosexuals 
will be pointless because although they are not non-existent, they are rare. This is analogous, in 
Levin’s opinion, to a person who is fat, lazy and happy. There indeed are people who are lazy, 
fat and happy, but given our “evolutionary history,” the odds are that a person who never 
exercises will suffer negative consequences. Furthermore, Levin argues that “lack of exercise is 
bad and even abnormal, not only because it is unhealthy, but also because one feels poorly 
without regular exercise” (Levin 234). Nature has selected people who enjoy exercise because 
our ancestors had to exercise to survive. Those who did not enjoy chasing or hunting game were 
eliminated. Specifically, “laziness leaves unreaped the reward nature has planted in exercise, 
even if the lazy man cannot tell this introspectively” (Levin 234). Thus, if this is an accurate 
description of exercise in human life, then “it is by the same token a correct description of the 
place of heterosexuality” (Levin 234). Levin is essentially claiming that while it may be true that 
there are happy homosexuals, they still suffer from negative consequences in the same way that a 
person who is fat, lazy and happy suffers from the consequences of a lack of exercise. While I 
disagree with his claim that homosexuals are bound to be less happy and have a higher 
probability of being unhappy, despite the fact that there are homosexuals who say that they are 
happy, I will not attack his argument on such empirical grounds. Namely, if this were the goal of 
my argument, it would amount to simply explaining empirical data, facts, studies and anecdotes 
about homosexuals and their levels of happiness. It would be a battle of citations rather than of 
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philosophy. Rather, I believe that Levin’s argument can be better taken apart on philosophical, 
rather than empirical grounds.  
IV. Evaluating the Argument 
 Now that Levin’s argument has been laid out and the terminology and terms clarified, I 
will now examine the merits of Levin’s argument. Remember that Levin claims that his 
argument permits gradations of abnormality and that the level of abnormality that a certain 
behavior entails depends on its likelihood to be extinguished or selected out by nature. I grant to 
Levin that homosexuality may be unnatural in that it does not increase fitness as a result of 
pleiotropy. Indeed, homosexuals do not leave descendants and pleiotropy has not been 
disproven. In fact, it is accepted amongst many evolutionary biologists. It is then not out of the 
realm of possibility that homosexuality survives through some other trait. Homosexuality then 
does not increase evolutionary fitness. However, I am challenging his claim that what is 
unnatural is unlikely to produce happiness. In defining as what is natural as what increases 
fitness, Levin commits himself to the claim that a sexual behavior counts as natural and thus 
fitness enhancing only if it is reproductive behavior or behavior that could lead to reproduction. 
Afterall, sexual activity that leads to reproduction increases fitness and thus is natural. Therefore, 
any sexual activity which does not lead to reproduction is unnatural. Such activity then produces 
unhappiness because what is unnatural leads to unhappiness. However, there are plenty of sexual 
behaviors that would be deemed unnatural under Levin’s terms, but that with high probability 
lead to happiness. 
 
 
 
Hansen  27 
 
A. Objection: Unnatural and Happy? Yes 
 
i. Celibate Priests and Homosexuals 
 
  There are all sorts of activities which lead to happiness but do not fit Levin’s definition of 
what is natural. Implicit in this analysis is the question: is any use of the penis other than entering 
into the vagina a misuse and therefore unnatural? Remember that one of Levin’s postulations is 
that “the misuse of bodily parts can with high probability be connected to unhappiness” (Levin 
233). This misuse is unnatural because it does not lead to and can never lead to reproduction or 
fitness enhancing activities. Yet, certainly there are people who refrain from using their sexual 
organs and who Levin himself admits are happy and normal. Take the case of a celibate priest. It 
would seem that no behavior is more likely to be selected out than celibacy and homosexuality. 
Celibate priests then should be just as unhappy as homosexuals. Levin is reluctant to admit this. 
Rather, his view is “compatible with the existence of happy celibates” (Levin 238). Thus, there is 
an apparent contradiction here because he is saying that homosexuals will be unhappy while 
celibate priests will be happy. 
 Levin anticipates this and has a line of response open to him that focuses on what makes 
human beings happy. Namely, celibate priests “deny themselves as part of a higher calling which 
yields compensating satisfactions” and that celibate priests “do not simply give up sexual activity 
without ill-effect; they give it up for a reason” (Levin 238). Homosexuals on the other hand, 
“have hardly given up the use of their sexual organs, for a higher calling or anything else. [They] 
continue to use them, but, unlike priests, they use them for what they are not for” (Levin 238). 
Homosexuals have no corresponding “higher calling” for their sexual activity. This allows Levin 
to illustrate that there really is no contradiction in claiming that celibate priests will be happy and 
homosexuals will be unhappy. Behind this reasoning is the idea that human beings find 
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happiness in being part of a higher calling or activity that they find meaningful outside of 
themselves. For example, many people find great happiness in charitable activities, volunteer 
service or being involved in anything that they believe will make the world a better place. It is 
very conducive to human happiness to be involved in some other-oriented activity. Celibate 
priests engage in this kind of happiness producing activity; serving God and His will. Levin’s 
claim then is that a misuse of sexual organs will not lead to unhappiness if there is some 
compensating benefit attached to such a misuse. Being homosexual however, is not akin to 
charitable service nor is it other-oriented. Yet, homosexuals do get compensating benefits from 
being homosexual. First, homosexuals get sexual pleasure from their activity. Second, their 
sexual activity is also part of a loving and fulfilling relationship and is an avenue towards 
deepening relational bonds, love and attachment. Thus, even if homosexuals do not derive the 
same compensating benefits as celibate priests do from their activity (or lack thereof), they do 
get some type of benefit. If homosexuals can derive compensating goods, in the same way that 
celibate priests can derive compensating goods, then there is no reason to treat homosexuals and 
celibate priests differently. In other words, from the above reasoning, it is inconsistent to make 
excuses for celibate priests but not for homosexuals. If celibate priests misuse their sexual organs 
and are happy, then logically, homosexuals will be happy too. Thus, what is unnatural can indeed 
lead to happiness in the case of homosexuals.  
 Levin could respond by claiming that while homosexuals may derive these benefits in 
some cases, their lifestyle will most likely lead them down a path of promiscuity. Levin makes 
the claim in his paper that a promiscuous lifestyle will lead to unhappiness. Specifically, it is a 
lifestyle “to be fellated by as many different men as possible” and such behavior “occasions 
misery and we may expect the misery of homosexuals to continue” (Levin 237). Homosexual 
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men then are not likely to use their sexual activity to attain the goods of long term fulfillment, 
love and relationship building. They are more inclined to use sex for promiscuous activity which 
will then lead to unhappiness.  
 On Levin’s behalf, there are indeed people who believe that the homosexual lifestyle is 
bound to lead to promiscuity. Essentially, these people hold the view that men are more inclined 
to have sex and have more sexual encounters in general, than women. In heterosexual 
relationships, women act as the restraint on the sexual desires of men. In homosexuality, there is 
no corresponding restraint. Thus, there will be more promiscuity.3 There is then a difference 
between celibate priests and homosexuals in that celibate priests’ celibacy does not occasion 
misery while homosexual activity does. 
 It is not clear that it is the sexual activity of homosexuals per se that makes them 
unhappy. Namely, it is plausible that it is the oppression of society and the general negative 
opinion that society takes towards the homosexual lifestyle that occasions this misery. It is safe 
to claim that society does not hold this negative opinion of celibate priests. When celibate priests 
give up the use of their sexual organs, it is not looked down upon by society. It is more likely to 
be admired. In contrast, the homosexual lifestyle is negatively viewed by society. I take up this 
issue in greater detail in section VII but it is enough to point out for my purposes in this section 
to note that oppressed groups in society could reasonably be expected to experience unhappiness. 
Homosexuals derive compensating benefits from their sexual activity, but society either tells 
them that they are deceiving themselves in their pleasure or that their compensating benefits 
really aren’t benefits but harms. This indeed could lead to unhappiness. If such a view is 
plausible, then there is no occasion to say that homosexuals and celibate priests should be 
                                                             
3 Again I thank Professor Rajczi of Claremont McKenna College for his help in explaining the support for 
Levin’s view 
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described differently in terms of happiness and a misuse of body parts. Homosexuals derive 
compensating benefits from their activity but have an added disadvantage that celibate priests do 
not have to face; the oppression of society. It is not the activity per se of homosexuals that 
occasions misery, but an outside factor. Therefore, what is unnatural can still lead to happiness in 
both the case of celibate priests and homosexuals. 
ii. Masturbation 
  What about people who masturbate? Does masturbation lead to unhappiness? I grant that 
under Levin’s definition, masturbation would be unnatural because it does not increase 
evolutionary fitness. It is worth noting that some people would be reluctant to grant that 
masturbation is unnatural, but I do not need to delve into this argument to undermine Levin. 
Remember that I am attempting to argue that what is unnatural does not always lead to 
unhappiness. Masturbation clearly does not lead to unhappiness. It is a regular human activity 
that substitutes actual sexual activity between two people. If it is argued that masturbation leads 
to unhappiness because it makes the person engaging in the activity feel lonely or sad that they 
do not have a partner, then I would reply that it is not masturbation per se that is making the 
person unhappy, but rather the fact that they are alone. Masturbation certainly is not the reason 
they are alone or lonely, it is simply an action undertaken for many different reasons, one of 
which may be a way to combat these feelings of loneliness. Furthermore, I believe that one 
would be hard pressed to argue that people do not find pleasure in masturbation. It seems then 
that under Levin’s definition, masturbation is unnatural, but it still leads to happiness and 
pleasure. 
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iii. Happiness outside of Sex 
  Levin also makes a shift later in his article that the very essence or behavior of 
homosexuals makes them unhappy. It is their promiscuity and desire to be “fellated by as many 
different men as possible” that “is the behavior that occasions misery,” rather than society’s 
contempt for homosexuals (Levin 237). Even if society were to drop their contempt for 
homosexuals, Levin argues that homosexuals would still be unhappy due to their lifestyle and 
patterns of behavior. Again, this is quite a logical stretch because it again assumes that what is 
natural usually leads to happiness and whatever is unnatural usually leads to unhappiness. There 
certainly are examples of heterosexuals who practice what Levin deems normal sex, but are 
unhappy because they have bad careers, bad relationships or have mental issues such as 
depression. They may be normal in every sense of Levin’s terms. All of their behaviors could be 
perfect for survival, yet they could still be miserable. Similarly, we can imagine homosexuals 
who “misuse” their body parts, but have a loving relationship with a significant other, which 
brings them great happiness. The core issue is that the concept of happiness depends on much 
more than sex or how it is practiced. Sex indeed can play a role in human happiness, but it does 
not play the entire part. 
 The preceding sections (i-iii) have attempted to show that Levin’s assumption, that what 
is unnatural leads to unhappiness, is incorrect. Namely, there are sexual activities (or non-
activities) that do not fit his definition of what is natural, but still lead to happiness. In response, 
Levin could simply change his definition of what is natural. Presumably, he could simply claim 
that certain activities are fitness enhancing in a wider range of cases that are unrelated to 
reproduction. Essentially, he could go in the opposite direction and claim that there are plenty of 
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sexual activities that are fitness enhancing that do not have to be related to reproduction. This 
would allow him to consistently maintain that activities such as masturbation, foreplay without 
sex and celibacy are natural and produce happiness. However, now he has no reason to exclude 
homosexual activity under this definition. If activities which do not lead to reproduction are 
natural and fitness enhancing, such as heterosexual anal sex, then homosexual activity can be 
considered natural as well because it has all the other characteristics of heterosexual activity. 
Namely, it produces the same goods of pleasure, intimacy and communication that heterosexual 
activity does. This leads Levin into a dilemma. 
V. Levin’s Dilemma 
 Recall that Levin has as a premise in his argument that behaving in natural ways 
produces happiness and behaving in unnatural ways is likely to produce unhappiness. If one asks 
Levin about what is natural, he could reply that natural sexual activity is activity that leads to 
reproduction. If this is so, we can produce counter-examples to show that what is unnatural does 
not lead to unhappiness. This was the point of the examples of the celibate priest and 
masturbation. On the other hand, if he says that natural sexual activities do not have to be related 
to reproduction, then he has no reason to say that homosexual activities are unnatural because 
they lead to the same goods that heterosexual activities do. Moreover, if Levin takes up this 
second position, this causes trouble for the foundation of his argument. Levin claims that 
homosexual activity is unnatural. If he now changes the definition of natural by saying that what 
is natural can include sexual activity that does not directly lead to reproduction, then it is not 
clear why he thought that homosexuality is not natural in the first place. Specifically, there seems 
to be no reason to call homosexual activity unnatural under such a definition. If we undermine 
this first premise, then Levin cannot move to his conclusion that homosexuality leads to 
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unhappiness. Namely, Levin’s argument is 1) homosexuality is unnatural due to the misuse of 
body parts, 2) what is unnatural leads to unhappiness, therefore, c) homosexuality leads to 
unhappiness. If we undermine (1) by saying that homosexuality, under Levin’s second definition 
of what is natural, is indeed natural, then he cannot move to the conclusion that homosexuality 
leads to unhappiness because his first premise is false under his own definition. Therefore, Levin 
is unlikely to explain natural in this way. Yet, he also cannot define natural sexual activity as 
activity that leads to reproduction because that runs into problems as well. This is the dilemma 
he faces. Both interpretations of his argument do not allow him to reach the conclusion that 
homosexuality leads to unhappiness.  
VI. A Further Objection to Levin: His Evolutionary Account is too Narrow 
 Levin’s explanation of the function of the penis in terms of evolution and purpose of 
sexual activity is too narrow. Specifically, Levin argues that homosexuals are bound to be 
unhappy because they are not properly using their sexual organs for the purposes that they were 
intended for and are therefore bound to be unhappy. As has been noted before, while it is indeed 
true that one function of sexual activity is to reproduce, it is not the only reason that we engage 
in sexual activity. Levin would have us take a narrow approach to sex in that if a penis is not 
inserted into a vagina, it is less pleasurable or somehow less rewarding. This is because nature 
has made the use of the penis in this way rewarding and has also rewarded such activity because 
those people who did this left behind ancestors, while those who engaged in penis-anal sex left 
no descendants. While this is true, it is much too narrow because unlike animals, we engage in 
sexual activity for a variety of other purposes. It is a way to increase and produce intimacy, form 
bonds and is pleasurable. We have evolved to use sexual activity in a way that other animals do 
not. Thus, even if two people do not have penis-vaginal intercourse, sex is still sex. Even if 
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homosexuals engage in penis-anal intercourse, this does not mean that it cannot fulfill all of the 
other purposes of sexual activity. Levin would have us think that we should use our sexual 
organs and sexuality in the way that we evolved to use it. However, if we evolved to use our 
sexual organs for these other purposes, then Levin’s argument is weak because even under his 
narrow conception of sex, it would be normal for homosexuals to engage in sexual activity and 
be happy because they are simply using their sexuality and sex organs for activity which they 
evolved to perform. Therefore, simply because homosexuals do not engage in heterosexual style 
sexual activity does not mean that it is somehow less pleasurable or unrewarding. It also seems 
difficult to advance an argument that is based on a heterosexual’s assumption of what may or 
may not be pleasurable or rewarding to a homosexual. Homosexuals clearly find their sexual 
activity rewarding and pleasurable or else they simply would avoid such activity. Levin’s current 
analysis of the evolution of sexual activity cannot account for this and is therefore too limited. 
VII. Homosexuals and the Oppression of Society 
 I mentioned earlier in this chapter that I would not be evaluating Levin’s empirical claims 
about the unhappiness of homosexuals. However, it is important to note that as a secondary and 
distinct argument, Levin is making a prediction about what we may discover in the world based 
on his evolutionary considerations. Essentially, he is attempting to confirm his speculations and 
hypothesis in a section entitled “Evidence and Further Clarification” about the unhappiness of 
homosexuals. 
  Levin claims that he has explained how “it is possible for homosexuality to be unnatural 
even if it violates no cosmic purpose or such purposes as we retrospectively impose on nature” 
(Levin 236). The basis for this claim is his generalized exclamation that “the fact is the 
universally acknowledged unhappiness of homosexuals. Even the staunchest defenders of 
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homosexuality admit that, as of now, homosexuals are not happy” (Levin 236). According to 
Levin, this unhappiness is not due to the environment of hostility engendered by society against 
homosexuals. A crucial test of this claim is his prediction that “homosexuals will continue to be 
unhappy even if people altogether abandon their ‘prejudice’ against homosexuality” (Levin 236). 
He claims that this prediction coheres with the evidence. Specifically, Levin argues that “it is 
consistent with the failure of other oppressed groups, such as American Negroes and European 
Jews, to become warped in the direction of ‘cruising,’ sado-masochism and other practices 
common in homosexual life” (Levin 236). This is a difficult argument to grasp and further 
explanation is necessary. 
 Essentially what Levin is aiming at with this argument is that homosexuals are 
disproportionately unhappy and the reason they are unhappy is due to their lifestyle, rather than 
because of the oppression of society. For example, he claims that “the immediate cause of 
unhappiness is a taste for promiscuity, anonymous encounters and humiliation” (Levin 236). It 
seems then that what drives men away from women and towards a lifestyle to be “fellated by as 
many different men as possible” is not related to what society thinks of this behavior (Levin 
237). Such behavior makes homosexuals miserable and therefore we should expect the misery of 
homosexuals to continue. His method of response to an opponent, who might claim that this 
unhappiness is in reality due to societal pressures and not the homosexual lifestyle, is to “test” 
such a claim against historical facts. Specifically, Levin takes the hypothesis of the opponent: if 
oppression is causing the unhappiness and the unhappiness is caused by promiscuity, then it must 
be that social oppression is causing promiscuity and therefore unhappiness. Levin tests this 
hypothesis by asking whether it is true that being oppressed leads to promiscuity and anonymous 
encounters. He then points out that other traditionally oppressed groups, such as African 
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Americans and Jews are not more likely to engage in promiscuity or other facets of the 
homosexual lifestyle. Oppression then does not lead to promiscuity and therefore unhappiness. 
Thus, Levin thinks he has disproven the hypothesis of his opponents.   
 Not quite. Levin misconstrues his opponent’s hypothesis. When Levin makes his claim 
about other traditionally oppressed groups, he assumes that his opponents believe that social 
oppression is mediated by promiscuity. In other words, Levin puts his opponents in a position 
that essentially says that oppression leads to promiscuity which leads to unhappiness. This is not 
what such an opponent would claim at all. An opponent simply believes that being oppressed 
leads to unhappiness because one is oppressed, not because it leads to promiscuity. He therefore 
does not even address what his opponents would claim. He has therefore not successfully 
defended himself against the claim that homosexuals are unhappy because of social oppression, 
not because of their conduct or use of their sexual organs. If it can be reasonably shown that such 
a claim is true, his argument is insignificant because the underpinnings of why homosexuals are 
unhappy, in his opinion, are false.    
VIII. Summary 
 We have seen that Levin’s prudential argument that homosexuals are bound to be 
unhappy because they are misusing their body parts runs into problems. First, if he defines as 
what is natural sexual activity as what increases evolutionary fitness or activity that is likely to 
lead to such fitness, then he is committed to the claim that only sexual activity that leads to 
reproduction is natural. This runs into the problem that there are plenty of sexual activities that 
do not fit his definition but that lead to happiness. Moreover, if he takes the opposite definition 
of what is natural by claiming that natural sexual activity does not need to lead to reproduction, 
then it is not clear why he defined homosexuality to be unnatural in the first place. He then 
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cannot make his conclusion that homosexuality leads to unhappiness under either definition of 
natural sexual activity. We also saw that his evolutionary account is too narrow and that he has 
not refuted the notion that homosexuals may be unhappy because society oppresses them, rather 
than as a result of the misuse of their body parts or their behavior. It seems then that there is not a 
reason to differentiate between homosexual and heterosexual Glenn and Stacy on the grounds 
that they are bound to be unhappy due to a misuse of their sexual organs. However, an opponent 
of homosexual activity could argue that Glenn and Stacy are not fulfilling the proper role of 
sexual activity and are therefore doing something immoral. Such an argument hinges on an 
understanding of a “means-end analysis” of sex. 
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C H A P T E R  3 :  W H A T  I S  S E X ?  
 It will be helpful to remind ourselves where we are in terms of the argument and the 
philosophical landscape that we have explored. First, we started with Corvino who established 
that on the face of things, that there is nothing wrong with homosexual conduct for a variety of 
reasons. We then reviewed an objection by Levin wherein he argued that as a result of 
homosexual misuse of body parts, they are bound to be disproportionately unhappy compared to 
heterosexuals. As such, society has a duty to protect people from activity that leads to 
unhappiness. This argument, I hope, has been refuted and thus bears no threat to Corvino’s 
argument. Thus, the only argument standing is: there is nothing wrong with homosexual conduct. 
However, there is an objection an opponent of homosexual conduct could raise which involves 
what I term to be a “means-end” analysis of sexual activity. The means end analyses are ways to 
get around criticisms I lodged against Levin and defeat the arguments I endorsed in favor of 
Corvino. Corvino says homosexual conduct realizes the same goods that heterosexuals realize in 
their sexual conduct. Levin argues that this is not the case in that homosexuality leads to negative 
consequences and does not realize the same goods. As I noted before, hopefully I have disproven 
this. The means-end analyses offer a different line of response by saying that the goods are 
irrelevant. According to means-end analysis, sex has a proper purpose and if an activity does not 
fulfill the proper definition of sex, which includes its purpose, then that sexual activity is wrong 
irrespective of its consequences. My opponents can then grant everything I have said thus far, 
but still have a line of response available. In other words, Corvino’s argument is a prima facie 
goods argument entailing that on the face of things homosexual activity is not immoral, but now 
upon further examination, supporters of a means-end analysis can say homosexuality is immoral 
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regardless of any consequences or goods that I believe follow from such conduct.  Alan 
Goldman, in his article “Plain Sex,” argues against such definitions of sexual activity.  
 Means-end definitions of sex take as their central premise that something only counts as 
sexual activity that fulfills a certain goal or end external to sex itself. Popular conceptions of 
such a definition of sex involve the idea that any type of activity which does not lead to 
reproduction, the expression of love, communication, or some level of interpersonal awareness, 
does not fall under the proper definition of sex. Specifically, Goldman points out that these 
theories of sex “attribute a necessary external goal or purpose to sexual activity, whether it be 
reproduction, the expression of love, simple communication, or interpersonal awareness” 
(Goldman 40). These types of analyses and definitions view “plain sex as merely a means to 
other separable ends” (Goldman 40). Following naturally from this means-end definition of sex, 
is the further premise that any sexual activity that does not fall under such a definition is deviant 
and incomplete and thus immoral. He states that “sex which does not fit one of these models or 
fulfill one of these functions is in some way deviant or incomplete” (Goldman 40). An opponent 
of homosexual conduct could then simply claim that homosexual sexual activity does not fall 
under such a means-end definition of sex and is therefore deviant, incomplete and thus immoral. 
Furthermore, such means-end analyses of sex are credible and do seem to match some of our 
intuitions about the role of sex in our lives. For example, some religious groups take the view 
that any sexual activity that does not lead to reproduction is wrong. Also, I take it as true that 
most people engage in sex not only to benefit from the pleasure that it gives, but also to express 
feelings of intimacy and romantic love with their partner. In other words, we use sex as a way to 
communicate our feelings in a way that simple words or other actions, such as making breakfast 
in the morning for our partner, cannot. Therefore, such means-end analyses do seem credible on 
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their face. To summarize, I take such means-end analysis to have two premises. The first is 
definitional premise and the other is a moral premise. Namely, (1) the correct definition of sex is 
means-end and (2) anything that does not fit such a definition is deviant, incomplete and 
immoral.  
 Goldman spends most of his time arguing against (1) by advancing his own definition of 
sex and hoping that it will better match our intuitions and judgments about sexual activity than 
means-end definitions. In this chapter I will also further develop an argument against (2), which I 
believe Goldman does not spend enough time arguing against. Before moving on to Goldman’s 
definition, it will be helpful to clearly articulate the methodology that Goldman utilizes to arrive 
at his definition of sex.  
 Goldman uses a term known to philosophers as “reflective equilibrium” to advance his 
definition of sex. Reflective equilibrium is the process by which we theorize to general concepts 
from our commonly held beliefs and judgments. While this may seem like a very abstract 
concept, we actually do this in our lives quite often when trying to come up with a definition of 
something. For example, if we are trying to figure out what the proper definition of a book is, 
somebody could say that it is something you read. One could reply that we read signs, journal 
articles, and dictionaries, but these are not books. The reply to this could be that it is something 
that tells a story. A further reply could be that there are short stories that we read that are not 
books. This line of reasoning continues until a correct definition is reached that matches our 
common beliefs and judgments about what a book is. This is Goldman’s method. In terms of 
Goldman then, such a process begins with a definition of sex and subsequent steps involve 
testing the definition against other theories, seeing if it fits with our ordinary understanding and 
judgments and revising the definition as needed if it does not. His ultimate goal then is for us to 
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conclude that his definition better matches our ordinary conceptions of sex than means-end 
analyses do and we should therefore accept his theory of sex over the means-end theories of sex.  
I. Goldman’s Definition of Sex 
 Goldman begins by giving us his definition of sex, “sexual desire is desire for contact 
with another person’s body and for the pleasure which such contact produces; sexual activity is 
activity which tends to fulfill such desire of the agent” (Goldman 40). At the core of this 
definition is the fact that “the goal of sexual desire and activity is the physical contact itself, 
rather than something else which this contact might express” (Goldman 40). His definition 
concentrates on the “physically manifested desire for another’s body, and […] take[s] as central 
the immersion in the physical aspect of one’s own existence and attention to the physical 
embodiment of the other” (Goldman 42). Such a definition does indeed recognize that we gain 
pleasure from sexual activity in expressing certain feelings towards our partner or from 
“awareness of the attitude of one’s partner,” but maintains that “sexual desire is essentially desire 
for physical contact itself: it is a bodily desire for the body of another that dominates our mental 
life for more or less brief periods” (Goldman 42). He recognizes that to some this may seem only 
to capture sexual activity at its barest, animalistic level, but he argues that it is worth focusing on 
this “least common denominator” in order to avoid “false views of sexual morality and 
perversion which emerge from thinking that sex is essentially something else” (Goldman 42). 
Goldman reviews the consequences of such “false views” later in his article but it is worth noting 
at present why focusing on the physical aspect of sexual activity is more beneficial than other 
conceptions.   
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II. What Counts as Sexual Activity under Goldman’s Definition 
 In terms of what counts as sexual activity, Goldman argues that his definition “in terms of 
the general goal of sexual desire appears preferable to an attempt to more explicitly list or define 
specific sexual activities, for many activities such as kissing, embracing […] may or may not be 
sexual, depending upon the context and more specifically upon the purposes, needs, or desires 
into which such activities fit” (Goldman 40). In other words, having a desire for physical contact 
with another person is a “minimal criterion for (normal) sexual desire, but is both necessary and 
sufficient to qualify normal desire as sexual” (Goldman 41). Our desire for physical contact itself 
without a desire to express other feelings, such as affection, “is sufficient to render sexual the 
activity of the agent which fulfills it […] various activities with this goal alone, such as kissing 
and caressing in certain contexts, qualify as sexual even without the presence of genital 
symptoms of sexual excitement” (Goldman 41). Thus, “the latter are not […] necessary criteria 
for sexual activity” (Goldman 41). With Goldman’s definition, we can thus avoid confusion 
regarding the many forms that sexual activity and desire manifests itself in, by focusing on the 
purely physical desire for another person. The advantage of Goldman’s definition over listing 
everything that counts as sexual activity can be seen in a simple example. It is standard in some 
cultures that people kiss upon greeting, whether the kiss is between a male and female, two 
males or two females. It would be absurd to classify such activity as homosexual or sexual at all 
because the act of kissing is an expression of greeting or familiarity. The act does not represent a 
desire for physical contact in itself and is therefore properly deemed un-sexual under Goldman’s 
definition. 
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  However, to some such a broad definition of sex may seem to be either “over- or 
underinclusive” (Goldman 41). It may too broad in that physical activities, such as wrestling or 
football, can be termed sexual activity under such a definition, which is clearly absurd. However, 
in these cases “the desire is not for contact with another body per se, it is not directed toward a 
particular person for that purpose, and it is not the goal of the activity” (Goldman 41). The intent 
of the agent matters to Goldman’s definition of sex. To illustrate, signs of affection and 
friendship can be manifested in various ways in our culture (hugging, stroking, cuddling, etc.) 
but if the intent is only to show friendship, such contact need not be classified as erotic or sexual. 
However, Goldman realizes that such intentions, such as showing friendship, can be valuable to 
sex when added to it, but such intentions are external to sex. Goldman’s definition also may 
seem to be too narrow in that sometimes a “person’s personality, not merely her or his body, may 
be sexually attractive to another, and in that looking or conversing in a certain way can be sexual 
in a given context without bodily contact” (Goldman 41-42). Goldman argues that while this 
may be true, it is not the “contents of one’s thoughts per se that are sexually appealing, but one’s 
personality as embodied in certain manners of behavior” (Goldman 42). Therefore, there is an 
innately physical aspect of sexual desire, even if we are sexually aroused by another’s 
personality. Furthermore, he argues that “if a person is sexually attracted by another’s 
personality, he or she will desire not just further conversation, but actual sexual contact” 
(Goldman 42). Goldman’s definition of sex then does not seem to be under-inclusive because it 
recognizes the emotional aspects of sexual activity and desire, but maintains that such emotional 
aspects are embedded largely in a desire for the person’s body or characteristics embedded in 
physical behavior.  
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III. The Case of Romantic Love 
 While Goldman’s analysis certainly takes into account a very obvious and real physical 
aspect of sexual desire and activity, there are certainly many who hold the view that sex is 
simply “an expression of love or affection between the partners” (Goldman 44). It is an 
expression of romantic love. If Goldman’s definition cannot account for this, then he will have 
trouble convincing us that his definition correctly matches our beliefs and judgments about sex. 
That being said, such a view of sex is taken by Bertrand Russell, who claims that “sex 
intercourse apart from love has little value, and is to be regarded primarily as experimentation 
with a view to love.”4 This seems like a strong and intuitive reason to condemn Goldman’s view 
of sex as simply being a physical desire for another’s body because sex that is embedded in 
emotional attachment and intimacy has heightened value and is frankly better than promiscuous 
and impersonal sex. Goldman however, acknowledges this. Specifically, he recognizes that “sex 
can take on heightened value and meaning when it becomes a vehicle for the expression of 
feelings of love or tenderness” (Goldman 44). It is also true, in his opinion, that other “mundane 
activities such as “getting up early to make breakfast on Sunday, cleaning the house” can also 
take on heightened value when such emotions are involved (Goldman 44). These enlightenments 
do not undermine or weaken Goldman’s definition. Although I believe that it is true that sex 
which involves the expression of love and intimacy is indeed better sex, this fact does not entail 
the conclusion that we engage in sex simply as a means to expressing those feelings. All it 
proves is that the expression of romantic love adds value to sex. When something adds value to 
something, it means that the thing that is adding value is external to what it is adding value to. To 
put it another way, if the value-adding entity were not external to what it is adding value to, then 
we would have no reason to engage in an activity or buy a product that does not have such value 
                                                             
4 Bertrand, Russell. Marriage and Morals. New York:Bantam, 1959 p. 87 
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added to it. Yet, in the case of sex, we do this all the time. Examples abound of one night stands 
and friends-with-benefits relationships. These examples illuminate that we often engage in sex 
that does not have such value. In such cases, we initially enter into the act of sex out of our desire 
for physical contact with another person. Therefore, the expression of romantic love adds value 
and is indeed external to the concept of sex. It is then implausible to claim that something which 
merely adds value to and is not embedded in sexual activity, can serve as a good end for sex. 
Rather, every sexual encounter involves an innate physical desire for contact with another, 
whether it is a married couple, a couple in a relationship or a one night stand. Characterizing sex 
as such then captures a wider range of sexual encounters and relationships than does the “means-
end analysis” of sex as a means to the expression of romantic love, as well as identifies a 
characteristic of all sexual encounters in a way that such a means-end analysis cannot. 
 A deeper issue is that there is an inherent tension in identifying sex with long-term love. 
When we fall in love with someone, we intend such feelings to be permanent and exclusive. It 
seems reasonable to claim that a person cannot “deeply love more than a few individuals even in 
a lifetime” (Goldman 44). In contrast, sexual desire can be fleeting and “can arise in relation to a 
variety of other individuals one finds sexually attractive […] it may even be, as some have 
claimed, that sexual desire in humans naturally seeks variety,” which is clearly not true of love 
(Goldman 44). This explains why monogamous sex usually “represents a sacrifice or the exercise 
of self-control on the part of the spouses, while monogamous love generally does not” (Goldman 
44). This latter statement may seem odd at first pass, but it is important to point out that there is 
no such thing as casual love in the sense in which Goldman uses the term. Such love is not 
comparable to the passing sexual desires we have for others and therefore does not represent 
such sacrifice or self-control to the extent that monogamous love does. There is also a practical 
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reason to distinguish between sex and love in that such a distinction “would help avoid 
disastrous marriages which result from adolescent confusion of the two when sexual desire is 
mistaken for permanent love, and would weaken damaging jealousies which arise in marriages in 
relation to passing sexual desires” (Goldman 45). Therefore, a clear distinction between sex and 
love is beneficial in both a practical and moral sense. It is important to note that Goldman is not 
claiming that sex is never to be connected with love or that sex does not take on heightened 
significance when it is used to express love. He is simply claiming that sex is not a means to the 
end of expressing love. There are many activities outside of sex that can express love, but what 
makes sex seem so connected with love is its intimacy; “like love, sex is held to lay one bare 
psychologically as well as physically” (Goldman 45). We must however distinguish between sex 
and love, if we are to avoid damaging results that emanate from a confusion of the two concepts.  
IV. Sex as a Means to Reproduction 
 Such a definition of sexual activity posits that we define sex as what is natural, seeing as 
the most natural form that sex takes is reproduction. However, sex cannot be defined as what is 
natural because we clearly engage in sex for reasons other than to reproduce. In this vein, 
Goldman argues that “while this may be ‘nature’s’ purpose, it certainly need not be ours” (42). 
The prevalence of one night stands and the pornography industry are sufficient to show that we 
engage in sexual activity for reasons other than to reproduce. Most importantly, the widespread 
use of contraception has moved our concept of sex away from a “rational sexual ethic” 
dependent upon the concept of reproduction and child rearing (Goldman 43). The fact that we 
use contraceptives illustrates that a definition, which posits that the main purpose of sex is to 
reproduce, does not match out intuitive judgments and considerations.  Rather, sex is simply a 
desire for another person’s physical being and to be in contact with that physical being. This 
Hansen  47 
 
definition better matches our considered judgments because it takes into account our widespread 
use of contraception and explains why some people engage in promiscuity in way that a natural 
definition of sex cannot.  
V. Sex as a Means of Communication 
 In regards to the argument that sex is a means of communication, Goldman argues that to 
take this view is to undermine and overlook the intrinsic value and nature of sexual acts. He 
reinforces this conclusion with his reasoning that if sex is a language, we must recognize that 
“the symbols” of language have no importance by themselves; “they function merely as vehicles 
for what can be communicated by them” (Goldman 46). In addition “skill in the use of language 
is a technical achievement that must be carefully learned; if better sex is more successful 
communication by means of a more skillful use of body language, then we had all better be well 
schooled in the vocabulary and grammar” (Goldman 46). If this is the metaphor, then this 
suggests that sex is more appropriately characterized by a “sex-manual approach” than for the 
“natural pleasure of the unforced surrender to feeling and desire” (Goldman46). Such an analysis 
does not match our intuitions about sex and therefore fails to reach a state of reflective 
equilibrium. For example, “if perversion represents a breakdown in communication,” this means-
end analysis of sex tends to count sexual acts or advances that fail in communication or are 
misunderstood by one partner or the other as being somehow not sexual (Goldman 47). It would 
be absurd to claim that a failed sexual advance by a male in bar towards another male or female, 
which fails simply because the female or male is uninterested, is somehow not considered to be 
sexual in nature. Furthermore, on such a conception, sex between a married couple who have 
been having sex together for years would become dull and “subnormal” because the 
“communicative content would be minimal in lacking all novelty” (Goldman 47). Finally, 
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masturbation would no longer be a “release or relief from physical desire through a substitute 
imaginative outlet” but would simply be a method of practicing one’s communicative technique 
on oneself (Goldman 47). Such characterizations of sex and masturbation seem absurd and 
contrary to our natural intuitions about sexual activity. At its core, this view of sex over-
intellectualizes its nature and indeed “seems more appropriate to a sophisticated seduction scene 
than to the sex act itself” (Goldman 48). In this vein, sex does indeed seem to be a way of 
relating physically, rather than intellectually, with another person.  
 Goldman’s definition of sex then fills in the inadequacies of this means-end analysis 
definition of sex. First, it takes into account the inherent and intrinsic value of sex by 
emphasizing its physical nature, rather than over-intellectualizing it. Secondly, Goldman’s 
definition also better characterizes the failure of the male in the bar as a natural feature of human 
society, interaction and attraction. Some people simply do not desire physical contact in a sexual 
way with certain other people. Such failures are not perverted, but a simple fact of life. Thirdly, 
under Goldman’s definition, sex between longtime married couples will not become dull or 
lacking in novelty because sex is simply a physical desire for contact with another person and for 
the pleasure that such contact brings. This implies that as long as that desire exists, they will 
continue to have sex and enjoy it, as most married couples do. In these cases, Goldman’s 
definition better matches our considered judgments and opinions about sexual activity than the 
means-end analysis that views sex as a means to communication. 
VI. Brief Summary 
 Goldman has thus produced an objection to the first premise of the means-end analyses 
by presenting his own definition of sex that better captures our own moral judgments and 
opinions about sex. Recall that the means-end analysis began with the definition that sex is to be 
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defined in a means-end way. Since Goldman has rebuked this first premise, a supporter of a 
means-end analysis of sex cannot then move on to moral premise (2) and claim that any sexual 
activity that does not meet such a means-end definition is immoral or wrong. However, it is 
helpful to point out a quick objection to the second premise of the means-end analysis, which 
claims that any definition of sex which does not fit into a means-end analysis is deviant and 
immoral. 
VII. Objection to premise (2) of Means-End Analysis Definitions of Sex 
 Simply because something is not used in its proper way, or in a way that it is not 
designed for, does not mean that what you are doing is immoral or deviant. This is relevant to 
those opponents who would grant Goldman his definition of sex but still maintain that the 
physical desire for another man, or the physical desire to put one’s penis into the anus of another 
man is wrong because that is not what the penis is designed to do and its purpose is thus not 
being fulfilled in the way that nature intended. Such an argument is reminiscent of Levin but 
stronger because Levin only claims that such a misuse leads to unhappiness, not that such a 
misuse is immoral. However, such an argument is easily refuted because we use things in ways 
that they were not designed for all the time. We might use toothpicks to build a miniature model 
house, or make art out of food, build a paper airplane out of paper, etc. The examples are 
limitless. Using these items is clearly not immoral, even if they are not fulfilling their purpose or 
doing what they were designed to do. If this is true, then it is not clear why using the penis for 
something that it is not designed for is immoral. Opponents must give a response as to why using 
the penis against its design is morally different than using any other object against its design. If it 
is replied that it is because the penis is part of the body, then it can be responded that we misuse 
some of our other body parts too. For example, we developed thumbs to help us grab onto things, 
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but many people and children use their thumbs to satisfy an urge to chew or to suck on 
something. Such actions are not what the thumb is designed for, but engaging in such activity is 
certainly not immoral. Therefore, we need a better reason to morally distinguish between a 
“misuse” of inanimate objects/ certain other body parts and the penis.  
 Therefore, there is another way to object to premise (2) of the means-end analysis aside 
from undermining premise (1), which is purely definitional. Another implication of this 
conclusion is that we do not necessarily need to agree wholeheartedly with Goldman’s definition 
to defeat the moral conclusion of means-end definitions of sex.  
VIII. Moral implications of Goldman’s Definition of Sex 
 Goldman states simply that “there are no moral implications whatever” to his definition 
of sex (49). Homosexual conduct then cannot be deemed immoral under such a definition 
precisely because there are no moral implications of Goldman’s definition. A few clarifying 
comments must be made before moving into a fuller explanation of what this means exactly. 
First, while we can claim that the definition of sex has no moral implications, Goldman has not 
proven that there is not some other moral reason as to why homosexual activity is wrong. In 
other words, homosexual conduct can’t just be wrong by definition, it can be wrong on other 
grounds. Goldman has only proven that there is nothing wrong with homosexual activity that 
follows from the very definition of sex. This is where John Corvino’s argument provides support. 
Corvino’s argument supplements and is stronger than Goldman’s argument because Corvino’s 
argument is wider in scope and provides other reasons, besides ones of definition, as to why 
homosexual activity is not wrong on its face. Second, it must be made clear that Goldman is not 
arguing that all forms of sexual activity are moral. Goldman would hold that public displays of 
sex or violent sexual acts are wrong and immoral. The key to understanding Goldman is to not 
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think about the particular act, but to think about the reasoning behind why the act is wrong. 
Specifically, “there is no morality intrinsic to sex” in that a sexual act is not wrong because it is 
sexual per se, but because of some other prevailing reason (Goldman 49). More specifically, “no 
conduct, and nothing in sex is immoral unless condemned by rules which apply elsewhere as 
well” (Goldman 50). Rape is immoral because it is “an extreme violation of a person’s body, of 
the right not to be humiliated, and of the general moral prohibition against using other persons 
against their wills, not from the fact that it is a sexual act” (50). The ethical methodology of this 
view of the morality of sex requires that general moral rules be applied to sexual conduct and 
then such cases are to be evaluated with this moral standard or rule in mind. To illustrate, in 
cases of child molestation, such acts are not wrong or immoral because they are sexual. The 
wrongness of such an act is derived from the “detrimental effects such behavior can have on the 
future emotional and sexual life of the naïve victims, and from the fact that such behavior 
therefore involves manipulation of innocent persons without regard for their interests” (Goldman 
50). Such a case of sexual abuse then is characterized as immoral not because it is sexual, but 
because it involves a violation of general moral rules that apply to other realms besides sexual 
conduct. Namely, such an act violates our general moral rules against violating the body of a 
non-consenting person and manipulating and harming innocent or defenseless people or persons. 
This observation makes a powerful case for the morality of homosexual conduct. 
IX. The Effects of these Moral Implications to the Morality of Homosexual Conduct 
 Michael Levin’s case for the wrongness of homosexual conduct revolves around a misuse 
of body parts. The fact that a man puts his penis into the anus of another man is a violation of 
nature’s intended purpose for those specific body parts. Goldman has illuminated that sex is 
simply a desire for physical contact with another being and does not fulfill any function other 
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than that. Furthermore, such homosexual conduct is sexual and is intended to be sexual, so Levin 
cannot get out of the argument by attempting to claim that it is purely a matter of physical 
function, rather than one of sexual desire. It seems odd then, if this is the proper definition of sex 
and sexual desire, to dictate how exactly one should properly fulfill such a desire for physical 
contact, if there is a proper way of doing so at all. In this vein, Goldman’s argument has also 
illuminated that such a sexual desire cannot be wrong or immoral, unless it violates another 
general moral principles that can be applied elsewhere. It seems clear that one’s preference to 
engage in anal sex with a member of the same sex does not violate a general moral principle. If 
such an act is done privately and with consent, then there is no moral violation of either agent 
engaging in such an act nor is it violating the rights of some third-party.  
 This conclusion is also consistent with Goldman’s condemnation of means-end analysis. 
Such analyses improperly label certain sexual acts as immoral in an inconsistent fashion. For 
example, homosexual conduct is immoral either because it does not lead to reproduction or 
because certain sexual organs are not being used properly. Such analyses are wholly inconsistent 
because heterosexual anal intercourse does not lead to reproduction and sexual organs are not 
being used for their proper purposes (in Levin’s view), yet such heterosexual conduct is not as 
wholly condemned as homosexual conduct is. Thus, for opponents of homosexual conduct to be 
consistent, they must deem such conduct immoral because it involves people of the same sex. 
However, if sex is an expression of physical desire and fulfills no further purpose, it seems 
absurd to claim that two males should be morally condemned for seeking such pleasure, while a 
male and female can pursue the same pleasure and not be similarly condemned. It is worth 
repeating that homosexual conduct is not immoral on Goldman’s view in terms of the definition 
of sexual conduct. There may be other non-definitional reasons to condemn it. However, 
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Goldman and Corvino coupled together respectively provide a definitional and wide reaching 
support for the morality of homosexual conduct.  
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C O N C L U S I O N  
 John Corvino posited that what is sexually permissible for heterosexuals is also 
permissible for homosexuals. This was achieved by illustrating that homosexual activity can lead 
to the same goods as heterosexual activity in the form of love, communication, intimacy and 
pleasure. Contra Corvino, Michael Levin posited that a key reason to treat homosexuals 
differently is because they are misusing their body parts in a way that heterosexuals do not. Such 
a misuse is unnatural because it does not increase evolutionary fitness. This fact, coupled with 
his assertion that what is unnatural leads to unhappiness, leads Levin to the claim that 
homosexuals are bound to be less happy than heterosexuals. We saw that such a conclusion is 
unwarranted because any way that Levin attempts to explain exactly what natural sexual activity 
is leads him into a dilemma. This dilemma restricts him from reaching his final conclusion; that 
homosexuals are bound to be less happy than heterosexuals. We also examined other issues 
related to his argument involving his evolutionary account and the relation of the oppression of 
society to homosexual unhappiness. However, even in refuting Levin, my opponent could appeal 
to a means-end analysis of sex. Such a definition of sex posits that the proper definition of sex is 
one that defines the proper role of sex as fulfilling a certain goal or end external to sexual activity 
itself .Through our analysis of Goldman, we saw that his definition of sex better matches our 
common intuitions and judgments than any form of means-end analysis. Goldman’s definition 
then entails that there are no moral consequences of an activity simply because it is sexual. 
Namely, for an activity to be considered immoral, it cannot be because it is sexual. It must be 
wrong on other grounds. Given this, we should then conclude that homosexual conduct should be 
given the same positive moral status as heterosexual sexual conduct. If there are no reasons to 
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condemn homosexuality aside from the fact that it is sexual, then we have no grounds to claim 
that heterosexual activity is moral and homosexual activity is immoral. 
   In this vein, I realize that my thesis does not take into account other popular objections 
to homosexual conduct, such as the PIB argument and religious arguments. Such arguments may 
indeed give reasons outside of sexuality to morally differentiate between homosexual and 
heterosexual conduct. To illustrate, PIB stands for “polygamy, incest, bestiality” and essentially 
claims that once we open the door to homosexual marriage or condone homosexual conduct, we 
open the door to polygamy, incest and bestiality. I avoided this argument simply because it 
largely applies to homosexual marriage, rather than conduct. In my introduction I stated my 
reasons for avoiding the topic of marriage to focus instead on the conduct and relationships of 
homosexuals. I found this topic of homosexual conduct more significant and interesting than the 
topic of marriage because marriage revolves around such conduct and relationships. Namely, I 
believe that the debate should focus on issues that Corvino himself brings up; love, happiness 
and goods that can be realized by homosexual relationships and conduct. Focusing on marriage 
involves legal disputes that detract from important aspects of human relationships and the goods 
that heterosexual and homosexual relationships can both realize. If we recognize that 
homosexual conduct does not carry the negative consequences some associate with it and rather 
come to realize that homosexual relationships can be just as loving, caring and intimate as 
heterosexual relationships, then the marriage debate will be put into proper perspective because 
what is marriage besides an eternal sacrifice and commitment to love and care for someone else? 
Certainly homosexuals are capable of this and their relationships are conducive to this goal of 
marriage, as the above fifty pages have hopefully illuminated. 
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 In terms of religion, such arguments can fall into two categories 1) doctrinal arguments 
related to bible verses and what the bible says. Supporters of such arguments say that the bible is 
true, and that is that. There is not much hope of making philosophical progress here without 
doing biblical interpretation or undertaking arguments in the field of philosophy of religion about 
the existence of God. However I believe most religious people to fall into the second category, 2) 
as people who do not take every single bible verse as dogma without further ethical reasoning. 
There are clear disagreements among religious people about what exactly the bible says, which is 
justification for my belief that many religious people are in category (2). In this vein, most 
religious people engage in moral reasoning. For example, there are biblical passages that endorse 
slavery, but most people believe slavery is wrong and would therefore think about whether a 
loving god would want slavery5. I believe that I have a contribution to this kind of religious 
thinking in my assumption that people are willing to sit down and discuss why homosexuality is 
immoral or not, albeit from a secular standpoint. Indeed, I believe my arguments would appeal to 
religious people who are not going on pure doctrinal faith. I can imagine a religious person 
reading the Glenn and Stacy example who would afterwards admit that it is a clever example and 
would react in puzzlement. They would admit that suddenly their approval shifted and would ask 
themselves why such a moral shift took place. In my opinion, this is a valuable philosophical and 
ethical thinking process. 
 Also, to non-religious people, secular arguments are very important and I believe that I 
have done much for non-religious people in this thesis. Not everyone believes in the bible, has 
read it or has engaged in moral reasoning involving it. Such people then appreciate arguments 
which do not solely appeal to the Word. In this vein, I have examined and considered some of 
the strongest arguments that I know of and that philosophers have picked out for use in 
                                                             
5 I thank Professor Alex Rajczi  of Claremont McKenna College for pointing this out to me 
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classrooms, anthologies and discussions. Although, I can’t logically rule out that there is not 
some argument out there that I have not thought of, I tried to engage with the arguments that I 
believed to be best and that would benefit the most people. I admit that I might be wrong, but the 
fact that I chose the strongest arguments and that I resolved it in a certain way illustrates the 
philosophical process. There may be other reasons to treat homosexuals differently from 
heterosexuals in light of these arguments, but I hope that I have successfully argued for the 
positive moral status of homosexuals in terms of their conduct. The goal of great philosophy is to 
present sound ideas and arguments that are thought provoking and that contribute to furthering 
the discussion of the topic being written about. In philosophy, there will never be unanimous 
agreement, but in the pursuit of this ideal hopefully philosophers can open minds and inspire 
thought in new and exciting directions. If there is anything I have accomplished in this thesis, my 
hope is that I have accomplished just that. 
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